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ABSTRACT 
 
The Effect of Unemployment Benefit Generosity on Unemployment 
Duration: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Slovenia* 
 
The paper analyses the effects of a 2011 increase in the unemployment benefit replacement 
rate on the job-finding rate of Slovenian benefit recipients. Using registry data on the universe 
of Slovenian unemployment benefit recipients, we exploit legislative changes that selectively 
increased the replacement rates for certain groups of workers while leaving them unchanged 
for others. Applying this quasi-experimental approach, we find that increasing the 
replacement rate significantly decreased the hazard rate of the transition from unemployment 
to employment, with an implied elasticity of the hazard rate with respect to benefit 
replacement rate being 0.7 to 0.9. The results also show that the increase of the 
unemployment benefit replacement rate does not affect the job-finding probability of 
jobseekers whose reason for unemployment is employer exit, and that the effects of the 
increase of replacement rate are present only upon exit to employment and not to inactivity. 
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𝜃𝑑𝑖𝑑
𝜃𝐷𝑖𝐷 = (𝐸[𝑌𝑡+1(1) | 𝐷 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑌𝑡(0)| 𝐷 = 1]) − (𝐸[𝑌𝑡+1(0)| 𝐷 = 0] − 𝐸[𝑌𝑡(0)| 𝐷 = 0]) (1)  
𝜃𝑑𝑖𝑑
𝜃𝐷𝑖𝐷 = 𝐸[𝑌𝑡+1(1) − 𝑌𝑡+1(0)] 
(2)  
𝜃𝑑𝑖𝑑
λ(t | 𝑇, 𝐿, 𝐼, 𝑋) =  λ
0
(t) ∙ 𝑒𝛼𝑇+𝛽𝐿+𝛾𝐼+𝛿̓ ´ ̓𝑋 (3)
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Notes: Vertical line denotes threshold for assignment into treatment or control group.  
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Variable Mean 
Prior to legislative 
change
After legislative 
change
Prior to legislative 
change
After legislative 
change
Gender
Men 0.542 4.5 4.9 95.5 95.1
Women 0.458 7.2 6.9 92.8 93.1
Age
Age under 25 0.050 1.8 1.6 98.2 98.4
Age 25-29 0.161 7.8 7.9 92.2 92.1
Age 30-39 0.371 7.2 7.3 92.8 92.7
Age 40-49 0.302 4.5 4.3 95.5 95.7
Age 50+ 0.116 2.1 3.6 97.9 96.4
Education
Primary education 0.197 0.7 1.4 99.3 98.6
Technical secondary education 0.334 1.5 2.0 98.5 98.0
General secondary education 0.292 4.6 4.5 95.4 95.5
2-year tertiary 0.087 9.1 11.3 90.9 88.7
4-year tertiary 0.090 21.7 20.5 78.3 79.5
Work history
Unemployment due to bankruptcy 0.138 4.6 5.8 95.4 94.2
Note: The total number of individuals in the control group is 2,170, of which 1,204 entered unemployment after the legislative change. The total 
number of individuals in the control group is 35,735, of which 19,722 entered unemployment after the legislative change. The total number of 
individuals in the sample is 37,905.
Table 1: Summary statistics of key variables
Control group Treatment group
Share of individuals in category
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Baseline
Larger 
treatment 
group
Smaller 
treatment 
group
Continuing firms 
only
Exiting firms 
only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Policy and time-varying variables (baseline: control group under old law)
γ (interaction coefficient for α and β) 0.874** 0.895** 0.884** 0.825*** 1.092
(0.0466) (0.0470) (0.0539) (0.0475) (0.164)
β (included in the treatment group) 0.908** 0.914** 0.888*** 0.906** 0.911
(0.0366) (0.0374) (0.0401) (0.0387) (0.115)
α (started receiving UB in 2011) 0.930 0.907** 0.926 0.959 0.825
(0.0446) (0.0427) (0.0520) (0.0494) (0.115)
UB design  -- Potential benefit duration  (baseline: potential benefit duration of 3 months)
6 months 0.808*** 0.803*** 0.807*** 0.792*** 1.051
(0.0232) (0.0227) (0.0239) (0.0241) (0.111)
9 months 0.775*** 0.770*** 0.782*** 0.742*** 1.122
(0.0299) (0.0294) (0.0314) (0.0321) (0.130)
1 year 0.633*** 0.635*** 0.627*** 0.598*** 0.964
(0.0335) (0.0332) (0.0344) (0.0380) (0.126)
18 or 19 months 0.527*** 0.526*** 0.527*** 0.412*** 1.163
(0.0432) (0.0428) (0.0446) (0.0420) (0.200)
24 or 25 months 0.341*** 0.333*** 0.323*** 0.277*** 0.745
(0.0495) (0.0477) (0.0496) (0.0509) (0.188)
Work history (baseline: unemployed for reasons other than employer exit)
Unemployed due to employer exit 1.564*** 1.570*** 1.548***
(0.0487) (0.0482) (0.0501)
Gender (baseline: women)
Men 0.965 0.951** 0.948** 0.950** 1.104
(0.0222) (0.0215) (0.0225) (0.0236) (0.0719)
Age (baseline: under 25 years old)
25-29 1.044 1.042 1.048 1.058 0.760
(0.0496) (0.0485) (0.0501) (0.0522) (0.143)
30-39 0.981 0.963 0.984 0.978 0.796
(0.0462) (0.0447) (0.0468) (0.0481) (0.147)
40-49 0.975 0.953 0.968 1.009 0.663**
(0.0500) (0.0482) (0.0502) (0.0543) (0.126)
50+ 0.805*** 0.800*** 0.804*** 0.907 0.421***
(0.0637) (0.0628) (0.0649) (0.0781) (0.0955)
Education (baseline: primary school or less)
Secondary school (technical) 1.216*** 1.218*** 1.220*** 1.241*** 1.168**
(0.0404) (0.0400) (0.0408) (0.0468) (0.0809)
Secondary school (general) 0.863*** 0.852*** 0.853*** 0.845*** 1.021
(0.0306) (0.0298) (0.0307) (0.0332) (0.0839)
2-year tertiary 0.879*** 0.872*** 0.846*** 0.885** 0.923
(0.0403) (0.0392) (0.0409) (0.0440) (0.117)
4-year tertiary (or greater) 1.077* 1.076* 1.064 1.072 1.118
(0.0469) (0.0458) (0.0483) (0.0500) (0.173)
Observations 156,450 162,271 147,202 134,869 21,581
Number of subjects 37905 39305 35709 32472 5433
Number of Failures 8942 9272 8383 7384 1558
Time at risk (years) 7398 7675 6959 6366 1032
Log likelihood -91025 -94704 -84819 -73925 -12907
Notes: (1) contains individuals whose previous wage ranged from 730 to 1,313 EUR or 1,433 to 3000 EUR, (2) contains individuals whose  previous 
wage ranged from 730 to 3000 EUR, (3) contains  individuals whose previous wage ranged from 730 to 1,313 EUR or 1,433 to 2015 EUR. All 
specifications include controls for month of entry into unemployment. Sample is comprised of individuals who were eligible for unemployment 
benefits at the onset of unemployment. Failure is defined as exiting to employment; other exits from unemployment registry database are construed 
as censoring. See data section for details. Standard errors clustered by individual in parenthesis (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
Table 2: Estimates from Cox proportional hazards model
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Exit to 
employment Exit to inactivity
(1) (2)
Policy and time-varying variables (baseline: control group under old law)
γ (interaction coefficient for α and β) 0.828*** 0.676
(0.0477) (0.173)
β (included in the treatment group) 0.905** 1.743***
(0.0386) (0.329)
α (started receiving UB in 2011) 0.956 1.008
(0.0492) (0.242)
UB design  -- Potential benefit duration  (baseline: potential benefit duration of 3 months)
6 months 0.794*** 0.552***
(0.0241) (0.0624)
9 months 0.744*** 0.546***
(0.0322) (0.0922)
1 year 0.600*** 0.337***
(0.0381) (0.0969)
18 or 19 months 0.415*** 0.368**
(0.0422) (0.145)
24 or 25 months 0.281*** 4.69e-10***
(0.0517) (1.36e-10)
Gender (baseline: women)
Men 0.947** 1.044
(0.0236) (0.0934)
Age (baseline: under 25 years old)
25-29 1.064 0.669***
(0.0525) (0.0930)
30-39 0.986 0.543***
(0.0485) (0.0746)
40-49 1.018 0.506***
(0.0548) (0.0807)
50+ 0.911 0.589*
(0.0784) (0.179)
Education (baseline: primary school or less)
Secondary school (technical) 1.240*** 0.919
(0.0468) (0.121)
Secondary school (general) 0.846*** 0.848
(0.0332) (0.112)
2-year tertiary 0.886** 0.800
(0.0441) (0.144)
4-year tertiary (or greater) 1.069 0.982
(0.0498) (0.169)
Observations 134,869 134,869
Number of subjects 32472 32472
Number of Failures 7384 569
Log likelihood -74019 -5662
Table 3: Estimates from competing risks regressions
Notes: All specifications include controls for month of entry into unemployment. Sample is comprised of individuals who were 
eligible for unemployment benefits at the onset of unemployment. . See data section for details. Standard errors clustered by 
individual in parenthesis (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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